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Abstract
Generalized Darwinian evolutionary theory has
emerged as central to the description of economic
process (e.g., Aldrich et al., 2008). Here we demon-
strate that, just as Darwinian principles provide nec-
essary, but not sufficient, conditions for understand-
ing the dynamics of social entities, in a similar manner
the asymptotic limit theorems of information theory
provide another set of necessary conditions that con-
strain the evolution of socioeconomic process. These
latter constraints can, however, easily be formulated
as a statistics-like analytic toolbox for the study of
empirical data that is consistent with a generalized
Darwinism, and this is no small thing.
1 Introduction
A recent manifesto by Aldrich et al. (2008) makes a strong
case that Darwinian principles cover the evolution of social or
economic entities. They find that, although there are impor-
tant differences between biological and cultural domains and
the selection processes that affect them, and the particulars of
Darwinian mechanisms of variation, inheritance, and selection
differ in important ways, yet the overarching general princi-
ples remain. They argue that we must regard institutions
as cohesive entities having some capacity for the retention
and replication of problem solutions, and that innovation is
about the creation of new variations, while selection is about
how these are tested in the real world. An essential strain
in their argument is a paradigm of program-based behavior
that requires an explanation of emergence through both nat-
ural selection and individual development, in the context of
Eldredge and Gould’s ‘punctuated equilibria’ (Gould, 2002).
We reconsider this program in view of a recent expansion
of the classic Modern Synthesis that takes into account the
critical role of interaction in the real world (Wallace, 2010),
a matter of current interest in economics from dangerously
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simplistic perspectives (Johnson, 2011).
Lewontin (2010), reviewing the book by Fodor and Piatelli-
Palmarini (2010), describes the modern evolutionary synthe-
sis as having four basic metaphorical principles:
(1) The principle of variation: Among individuals in a
population there is variation in form, physiology, and behav-
ior.
(2) The principle of heredity: Offspring resemble their
parents more than they resemble unrelated individuals.
(3) The principle of differential reproduction: In a
given environment, some forms are more likely to survive and
produce more offspring than other forms.
(4) The principle of mutation: New heritable variation
is constantly occurring.
Lewontin, however, finds this structure lacking, in that
“...there is an immense amount of biology that is missing”,
largely involving interactions within and across structures and
entities at various scales.
To address this lack, Wallace (2010) introduces a fifth prin-
ciple:
(5) The principle of environmental interaction: In-
dividuals and groups engage in powerful, often punctuated,
dynamic mutual relations with their embedding environments
that may include the exchange of heritage material between
markedly different organisms.
The central innovation of that work is to avoid the intellec-
tual straightjacket of mathematical population genetics and
other replicator dynamics formalisms by describing embed-
ding ecosystem, genetic heritage, and (cognitive) gene expres-
sion in terms of interacting information sources whose dynam-
ics are driven by the homology between information source
uncertainty and free energy density in a series of regression-
like relations similar to the empirical Onsager equations of
nonequilibrium thermodynamics. Taking much the perspec-
tive of Champagnat et al. (2006), the resulting theory is
inherently coevolutionary, in the largest sense, so that there
is no single ‘natural’ scale at which ‘selection’ takes place.
There is, rather, a set of interactive quasi-equilibria subject
to often highly structured large deviations representing the
punctuated equilibria of Eldredge and Gould (1972), as well



































Here we adapt these results to the program of Aldrich et
al. (2008), and begin by restating some familiar phenomena
as information sources, leading to a formal structure that ex-
presses these extensions in terms of familiar coevolutionary
models.
2 Embedding ecosystems as infor-
mation sources
Firms interact with – and affect – embedding environments.
Here we xonaiswe social and economic ‘ecosystems’ in terms
of the rough regularities of their behavior, essentially a gram-
mar and syntax, without demanding dynamic or stochastic
simplicity: We characterize them as information sources –
generalized languages – capable of structured output within
broad constraints.
First consider a simplistic picture of a predator/prey
ecosystem. Let X represent the appropriately scaled num-
ber of ‘predators’, Y the scaled number of ‘prey’, t the time,
and ω a parameter defining their interaction. The model as-
sumes that the ecologically dominant relation is an interac-
tion between predator and prey, so that dX/dt = ωY and
dY/dt = −ωX
Thus the predator populations grows proportionately to the
prey population, and the prey declines proportionately to the
predator population.
After differentiating the first and using the second equation,
we obtain the simple relation d2X/dt2 + ω2X = 0 having
the solution X(t) = sin(ωt);Y (t) = cos(ωt). Thus X(t)2 +
Y (t)2 = sin2(ωt) + cos2(ωt) ≡ 1.
In the two dimensional phase space defined by X(t) and
Y (t), the system traces out an endless, circular trajectory in
time, representing the out-of-phase sinusoidal oscillations of
the predator and prey populations.
Divide the X − Y phase space into two components – the
simplest coarse graining – calling the halfplane to the left of
the vertical Y -axis A and that to the right B. This system,
over units of the period 1/(2piω), traces out a stream of A’s
and B’s having a single very precise grammar and syntax:
ABABABAB...
Many other such statements might be conceivable, e.g.,
AAAAA..., BBBBB..., AAABAAAB..., ABAABAAAB...,
and so on, but, of the obviously infinite number of pos-
sibilities, only one is actually observed, is ‘grammatical’:
ABABABAB....
More complex dynamical system models, incorporating dif-
fusional drift around deterministic solutions, or even very
elaborate systems of complicated stochastic differential equa-
tions, having various domains of attraction, that is, different
sets of grammars, can be described by analogous symbolic
dynamics (Beck and Schlogl, 1993, Ch. 3).
Rather than taking symbolic dynamics as a simplification of
more exact analytic or stochastic approaches it is possible to
generalize symbolic dynamics to a more comprehensive struc-
ture. Social, economic, or biological ecosystems may not have
identifiable sets of stochastic dynamic equations like noisy,
nonlinear mechanical clocks, but, under appropriate coarse-
graining, they may still have recognizable sets of grammar
and syntax over the long-term. The turn-of-the seasons in a
temperate climate, for many natural communities, looks re-
markably the same year after year: the ice melts, the migrat-
ing birds return, the trees bud, the grass grows, plants and
animals reproduce, high summer arrives, the foliage turns,
the birds leave, frost, snow, the rivers freeze, and so on. In
a social setting, interacting actors can be expected to behave
within fairly well defined cultural and historical constraints,
depending on context: birthday party behaviors are not the
same as cocktail party behaviors in a particular social set, but
both will be characteristic.
Suppose it possible to coarse grain the ecosystem at time t
according to some appropriate partition of the phase space in
which each division Aj represent a particular range of num-
bers of each possible fundamental actor in the generalized
ecosystem, along with associated larger system economic or
other parameters. What is of particular interest is the set of
longitudinal paths, that is, ecological or social system state-
ments of the form x(n) = A0, A1, ..., An defined in terms of
some natural time unit of the system. Thus n corresponds
to an again appropriate characteristic time unit T , so that
t = T, 2T, ..., nT .
To reiterate, the central interest is in the serial correlations
along paths.
Let N(n) be the number of possible paths of length n that
are consistent with the underlying grammar and syntax of the
appropriately coarsegrained eco- or social system.
The fundamental assumptions are that – for this chosen
coarse-graining – N(n), the number of possible grammatical
paths, is much smaller than the total number of paths possi-






both exists and is independent of path.
This is a critical foundation to, and limitation on, the mod-
eling strategy and its range of strict applicability, but is, in
a sense, fairly general since it is independent of the details of
the serial correlations along a path.
These conditions are the essence of the parallel with para-
metric statistics. Systems for which the assumptions are not
true will require special nonparametric approaches. One is
inclined to believe, however, that, as for parametric statisti-
cal inference, the methodology will prove robust in that many
systems will sufficiently fulfill the essential criteria.
Nonetheless, not all possible ecosystem coarse-grainings are
likely to work, and different such divisions, even when appro-
priate, might well lead to different descriptive quasi-languages



































is relevant. The essential Markov assumption is that the prob-
ability of a transition from one state at time T to another at
time T +∆T depends only on the state at T , and not at all on
the history by which that state was reached. If changes within
the interval of length ∆T are plastic, or path dependent, then
attempts to model the system as a Markov process within the
natural interval ∆T will fail, even though the model works
quite well for phenomena separated by natural intervals.
Thus empirical identification of relevant coarse-grainings
for which this body of theory will work is clearly not trivial,
and may, in fact, constitute the hard scientific core of the
matter.
This is not, however, a new difficulty in natural ecosystem
theory. Holling (1992), for example, explores the linkage of
ecosystems across scales, finding that mesoscale structures –
what might correspond to the neighborhood in a human com-
munity – are ecological keystones in space, time, and popula-
tion, and drive process and pattern at both smaller and larger
scales and levels of organization.
In this spirit, Levin (1989) argues that there is no single
correct scale of observation: the insights from any investiga-
tion are contingent on the choice of scales. Pattern is neither
a property of the system alone nor of the observer, but of an
interaction between them. Pattern exists at all levels and at
all scales, and recognition of this multiplicity of scales is fun-
damental to describing and understanding ecosystems. In his
view there can be no ‘correct’ level of aggregation: we must
recognize explicitly the multiplicity of scales within ecosys-
tems, and develop a perspective that looks across scales and
that builds on a multiplicity of models rather than seeking
the single ‘correct’ one.
Given an appropriately chosen coarse-graining, define joint
and conditional probabilities for different ecosystem paths,
having the form P (A0, A1, ..., An), P (An|A0, ..., An−1), such
that appropriate joint and conditional Shannon uncertainties
can be defined on them. For paths of length two these would
be of the form











P (Aj , Ak) log[P (Aj |Ak)],
(2)
where the Xj represent the stochastic processes generating
the respective paths of interest.
The essential content of the Shannon-McMillan Theorem is
that, for a large class of systems characterized as information
sources, a kind of law-of-large numbers exists in the limit of







n→∞H(Xn|X0, ..., Xn−1) =
lim
n→∞




Taking the definitions of Shannon uncertainties as above,
and arguing backwards from the latter two equations
(Khinchin, 1957), it is indeed possible to recover the first,
and divide the set of all possible ecosystem temporal paths
into two subsets, one very small, containing the grammati-
cally correct, and hence highly probable paths, that we will
call ‘meaningful’, and a much larger set of vanishingly low
probability.
Basic material on information theory can be found in any
number of texts, for example, Ash (1990), Khinchin (1957),
Cover and Thomas (1991).
3 Corporate heritage as an informa-
tion source
Adami et al. (2000) make a case for reinterpreting the Dar-
winian transmission of genetic heritage in terms of a formal
information process: genomic complexity can be identified
with the amount of information a sequence stores about its
environment. Thus genetic complexity can be defined in a
consistent information-theoretic manner. Most particularly,
in their view, information cannot exist in a vacuum and must
be instantiated. For biological systems information is instan-
tiated, in part, by DNA. To some extent it is the blueprint
of an organism and thus information about its own structure.
More specifically, it is a blueprint of how to build an organism
that can best survive in its native environment, and pass on
that information to its progeny. Adami et al. assert that an
organism’s DNA thus is not only a ‘book’ about the organism,
but also a book about the environment it lives in, including
the species with which it co-evolves. They identify the com-
plexity of genomes by the amount of information they encode
about the world in which they have evolved.
Ofria et al. (2003) continue in the same direction and ar-
gue that genomic complexity can be defined rigorously within
standard information theory as the information the genome of
an organism contains about its environment. From the point
of view of information theory, it is convenient to view Dar-
winian evolution on the molecular level as a collection of in-
formation transmission channels, subject to a number of con-



































codes for the information (a message) to be transmitted from
progenitor to offspring, subject to noise from an imperfect
replication process and multiple sources of contingency. In-
formation theory is concerned with analyzing the properties
of such channels, how much information can be transmitted
and how the rate of perfect information transmission of such
a channel can be maximized.
Adami and Cerf (2000) argue, using simple models of ge-
netic structure, that the information content, or complexity,
of a genomic string by itself (without referring to an environ-
ment) is a meaningless concept and a change in environment
(catastrophic or otherwise) generally leads to a pathological
reduction in complexity.
The transmission of genetic information is thus a contex-
tual matter involving operation of an information source that,
according to this perspective, must interact with embedding
(ecosystem) structures.
The essential analogy, at the level of the firm, is that there
will be a persistent, temporally transmitted, corporate cul-
ture, a Lamarckian backbone of learned habit, that, while
modifiable in the long term, will strongly constrain short-
term behaviors. We do not invoke replicator dynamics for
the description of this corporate culture, but characterize it
as another information source, a quasi-language, having rec-
ognizable grammar and syntax, so that certain kinds of be-
havioral ‘statements’ have high probability, and others are
either impossible or highly improbable.
4 Cognitive behavior of the firm as
an information source
A broad class of cognitive organizational phenomena – nec-
essarily occurring on a relatively short timescale compared
with the development and transmission of a corporate cul-
ture – can be characterized in terms of a dual information
source that can interact with other such sources. The argu-
ment is straightforward. Atlan and Cohen (1998) argue that
the essence of cognition is comparison of a perceived exter-
nal signal with an internal, learned picture of the world, and
then, upon that comparison, the choice of one response from
a much larger repertoire of possible responses. Such reduc-
tion in uncertainty inherently carries information, and it is
possible to make a very general model of this process as an
information source (Wallace, 2005).
Cognitive pattern recognition-and-selected response, as
conceived here, proceeds by convoluting an incoming external
‘sensory’ signal with an internal ‘ongoing activity’ – which in-
cludes, but is not limited to, a learned picture of the world
– and, at some point, triggering an appropriate action based
on a decision that the pattern of sensory activity requires a
response. It is not necessary to specify how the pattern recog-
nition system is trained, and hence possible to adopt a weak
model, regardless of learning paradigm, that can itself be more
formally described by the asymptotic limit theorems of infor-
mation theory. Fulfilling Atlan and Cohen’s (1998) criterion
of meaning-from-response, it is possible to define a language’s
contextual meaning entirely in terms of system output.
The model is as follows.
A pattern of ‘sensory’ input, say an ordered sequence
y0, y1, ..., is mixed in a systematic (but unspecified) al-
gorithmic manner with internal ‘ongoing’ activity, a se-
quence w0, w1, ..., to create a path of composite signals x =
a0, a1, ..., an, ..., where aj = f(yj , wj) for some function f .
This path is then fed into a highly nonlinear, but other-
wise similarly unspecified, decision oscillator generating an
output h(x) that is an element of one of two (presumably)
disjoint sets B0 and B1. We take B0 ≡ {b0, ..., bk}, B1 ≡
{bk+1, ..., bm}.
Thus the structure permits a graded response, supposing
that if h(x) ∈ B0 the pattern is not recognized, and if h(x) ∈
B1 the pattern is recognized and some action bj , k+1 ≤ j ≤ m
takes place.
The principal focus of interest is those composite paths
x triggering the pattern recognition-and-response. That is,
given a fixed initial state a0, such that h(a0) ∈ B0, one ex-
amines all possible subsequent paths x beginning with a0 and
leading to the event h(x) ∈ B1. Thus h(a0, ..., aj) ∈ B0 for
all 0 ≤ j < m, but h(a0, ..., am) ∈ B1.
For each positive integer n let N(n) be the number of gram-
matical and syntactic high probability paths of length n which
begin with some particular a0 having h(a0) ∈ B0 and lead to
the condition h(x) ∈ B1. Call such paths meaningful and
assume N(n) to be considerably less than the number of all
possible paths of length n – pattern recognition-and-response
is comparatively rare. Again assume that the longitudinal
finite limit H ≡ limn→∞ log[N(n)]/n both exists and is inde-
pendent of the path x. Call such a cognitive process ergodic.
Disjoint partition of state space may be possible according
to sets of states which can be connected by meaningful paths
from a particular base point, leading to a natural coset al-
gebra of the system, a groupoid. This is a matter of some
importance pursued at length in Wallace et al. (2009).
It is thus possible to define an ergodic information source X
associated with stochastic variates Xj having joint and con-
ditional probabilities P (a0, ..., an) and P (an|a0, ..., an−1) such
that appropriate joint and conditional Shannon uncertainties
may be defined which satisfy the relations above.
This information source is taken as dual to the ergodic cog-
nitive process.
Again, the Shannon-McMillan Theorem and its variants
provide ‘laws of large numbers’ permitting definition of the
Shannon uncertainties in terms of cross-sectional sums of the
form H = −∑Pk log[Pk], where the Pk constitute a proba-
bility distribution.
Different quasi-languages will be defined by different divi-
sions of the total universe of possible responses into various
pairs of sets B0 and B1. Like the use of different distortion
measures in the Rate Distortion Theorem, however, it seems
obvious that the underlying dynamics will all be qualitatively
similar.
Nonetheless, dividing the full set of possible responses into
the sets B0 and B1 may itself require higher order cognitive



































sity of choice within a more or less broad set of possible quasi-
languages. This would directly reflect the need to shift gears
according to the different challenges faced by the organization
or a subsystem. A critical problem then becomes the choice of
a normal zero-mode language among a very large set of pos-
sible languages representing accessible excited states. This
is a fundamental matter which mirrors, for isolated cognitive
systems, the resilience arguments applicable to more conven-
tional ecosystems, that is, the possibility of more than one
zero state to a cognitive system. Identification of an excited
state as the zero mode becomes, then, a kind of generalized
autoimmune disorder that can be triggered by linkage with
external ecological information sources that might represent
various kinds of structured stress.
In sum, meaningful paths – creating an inherent grammar
and syntax – have been defined entirely in terms of system
response, as Atlan and Cohen (1998) propose, a formalism
that can easily be applied to the stochastic neuron in a neural
network (Wallace, 2005).
Ultimately, it becomes necessary to parametrize the infor-
mation source uncertainty of the dual information source to
a cognitive pattern recognition-and-response with respect to
one or more variates, writing H[K], where K ≡ (K1, ...,Ks)
represents a vector in a parameter space. Let the vector K
follow some path in time, that is, trace out a generalized line
or surface K(t). We assume that the probabilities defining H,
for the most part, closely track changes in K(t), so that along
a particular piece of a path in parameter space the informa-
tion source remains as close to stationary – the probabilities
are fixed in time – and ergodic as is needed for the mathemat-
ics to work. Such a system is characterized as ‘adiabatic’ in
the physics literature. Between pieces it is possible to impose
phase transition characterized by a renormalization symme-
try, as done in Chapter 3 of Wallace et al. (2009). Such
an information source will be termed ‘adiabatically piecewise
stationary ergodic’ (APSE).
Again, the ergodic nature of the information sources is a
generalization of the law of large numbers and implies that
the long-time averages we will need to calculate can, in fact,
be closely approximated by averages across the probability
spaces of those sources. For non-ergodic information sources,
a function, J (xn), of each path xn → x, may be defined,
such that limn→∞ J (xn) = J (x), but J will not in general
be given by the simple cross-sectional laws-of-large numbers
analogs above (Khinchin, 1957). More details are given in
Wallace et al. (2009).
The essential argument is that the long-term corporate her-
itage information source that changes slowly with experience
or diffusion is the ‘genotype’ that constrains the cognitive be-
havior of the firm in the context of rapidly changing patterns
of threat and opportunity. That is, the cognitive behavior of
the firm is the ‘phenotype’, and selection, as is well known,
acts on phenotypes.
5 Interacting information sources
Here the three basic interacting information sources – embed-
ding socioeconomic environment, slowly-changing corporate
heritage, and rapid cognitive organizational response – are
modeled using a formalism similar to that invoked both for
nonequilibrium thermodynamics and traditional coevolution
(e.g., Diekmann and Law, 1996).
Consider a set of information sources representing these
three phenomena.
Use inverse measures Hj ≡ 1/Hj , j 6= m as parameters for
each of the others, writing Hm = Hm(K1...Ks, ...Hj ...), j 6=
m, where the Ks represent other relevant parameters.
Now segregate the Hj according to their relative rates of
change. Cognitive process would be among the most rapid,
followed by ecosystem dynamics and corporate heritage.
The dynamics of such a system becomes a recursive network
of stochastic differential equations, similar to those used to
study many other highly parallel dynamic structures (Wymer,
1997).
Letting the Kj and Hm all be represented as parameters
Qj , (with the caveat that Hm not depend on Hm), one can
define a ‘disorder’ measure analogous to entropy in nonequi-
librium thermodynamics, following the arguments of Wal-
lace and Wallace (2008, 2009) and Wallace et al. (2009),
SmH ≡ Hm −
∑
iQi∂Hm/∂Qi to obtain a complicated recur-
















σ(t, Q1, .., Qn)dBit,
(4)
where terms have been collected and expressed both the H’s
and the external K’s in terms of the same Qj .
The index m ranges over the crosstalk and it is possible to
allow different kinds of ‘noise’ dBit, having particular forms of
quadratic variation that may, in fact, represent a projection of
environmental factors under something like a rate distortion
manifold (Glazebrook and Wallace, 2009).
One approach to this result hinges on the homology be-
tween information source uncertainty and free energy den-
sity, following the example of Feynman (2000). Then the Sm
are analogous to entropies in nonequilibrium thermodynam-
ics, and equation (4) is simply an empirical Onsager equation
in the gradient of the entropies, recognizing that there are no
‘reciprocal Onsager relations’ possible for this system, since
there is not local reversibility. For example the sequence ‘ eth



































The basis of the general argument lies in the formal similar-
ity between the expression for free energy density and infor-
mation source uncertainty, explored in more detail in Wallace
and Wallace (2008, 2009):
Let F (K) be the free energy density of a physical system,
K the normalized temperature, V the volume and Z(K,V )
the partition function defined from the Hamiltonian charac-













similar to the first part of equation (3).
If a nonequilibrium physical system is parametrized by a
set of variables {Qi}, then the empirical Onsager equations






where the Li,j are empirical constants. The stochastic version
is just equation (4), with ‘S’ defined in terms of information
as




There are several obvious possible dynamic patterns:
1. Setting equation (4) equal to zero and solving for station-
ary points gives attractor states since the noise terms preclude
unstable equilibria.
2. This system may converge to limit cycle or pseudoran-
dom ‘strange attractor’ behaviors in which the system seems
to chase its tail endlessly within a limited venue – the tradi-
tional Red Queen.
3. What is converged to in both cases is not a simple state
or limit cycle of states. Rather it is an equivalence class, or
set of them, of highly dynamic information sources coupled by
mutual interaction through crosstalk. Thus ‘stability’ in this
structure represents particular patterns of ongoing dynamics
rather than some identifiable static configuration.
Here we are indeed deeply enmeshed in a highly recursive
phenomenological stochastic differential equations (e.g., Zhu
et al. 2007), but in a dynamic rather than static manner.
The objects of this dynamical system are equivalence classes
of information sources, rather than simple ‘stationary states’
of a dynamical or reactive chemical system. The necessary
conditions of the asymptotic limit theorems of communication
theory have beaten the mathematical thicket back one layer.
It is of some interest to compare these results to those of
Diekmann and Law (1996), who invoke evolutionary game
dynamics to obtain a first order canonical equation for coevo-





The si, with i = 1, ..., N denote adaptive trait values in a
community comprising N species. The Wi(s
′
i, s) are measures
of fitness of individuals with trait values s′i in the environment
determined by the resident trait values s, and the Ki(s) are
non-negative coefficients, possibly distinct for each species,
that scale the rate of evolutionary change. Adaptive dynamics
of this kind have frequently been postulated, based either on
the notion of a hill-climbing process on an adaptive landscape
or some other sort of plausibility argument.
When this equation is set equal to zero, so there is no time
dependence, one obtains what are characterized as ‘evolution-
ary singularities’ or stationary points.
Diekmann and Law contend that their formal derivation of
this equation satisfies four critical requirements:
1. The evolutionary process needs to be considered in a
coevolutionary context.
2. A proper mathematical theory of evolution should be
dynamical.
3. The coevolutionary dynamics ought to be underpinned
by a microscopic theory.
4. The evolutionary process has important stochastic ele-
ments.
Equation (4) above is similar, although reached by a much
different route, one giving elaborate patterns of phase transi-
tion punctuation in a highly natural manner (Wallace et al.,
2009). Champagnat et al. (2006), in fact, derive a higher
order canonical approximation extending equation (5) that is
closer to equation (4), that is, a stochastic differential equa-
tion describing evolutionary dynamics. Champagnat et al.
(2006) go even further, using a large deviations argument to
analyze dynamical coevolutionary paths, not merely evolu-
tionary singularities. They contend that in general, the is-
sue of evolutionary dynamics drifting away from trajectories
predicted by the canonical equation can be investigated by
considering the asymptotic of the probability of ‘rare events’
for the sample paths of the diffusion.
By ‘rare events’ they mean diffusion paths drifting far away
from the canonical equation. The probability of such rare
events is governed by a large deviation principle: when a crit-
ical parameter (designated ) goes to zero, the probability that
the sample path of the diffusion is close to a given rare path
φ decreases exponentially to 0 with rate I(φ), where the ‘rate
function’ I can be expressed in terms of the parameters of the
diffusion. This result, in their view, can be used to study long-
time behavior of the diffusion process when there are multiple
attractive evolutionary singularities. Under proper conditions
the most likely path followed by the diffusion when exiting a
basin of attraction is the one minimizing the rate function



































exit the basin is of the order exp(H/) where H is a quasi-
potential representing the minimum of the rate function I
over all possible trajectories.
An essential fact of large deviations theory is that the rate
function I which Champagnat et al. (2006) invoke can al-
most always be expressed as a kind of entropy, that is, in the
form I = −∑j Pj log(Pj) for some probability distribution.
This result goes under a number of names; Sanov’s Theorem,
Cramer’s Theorem, the Gartner-Ellis Theorem, the Shannon-
McMillan Theorem, and so forth (Dembo and Zeitouni, 1998).
A detailed example is given in R. Wallace and R.G. Wallace
(2008).
These considerations lead very much in the direction of
equation (4) above, now seen as subject to internally-driven
large deviations that are themselves described in terms of in-
formation sources providing another H parameter that can
trigger punctuated shifts between quasi-stable modes, in addi-
tion to resilience transitions driven by ‘catastrophic’ external
events that may well include the exchange of heritage infor-
mation between different classes of organization or at different
organizational scales.
Equation (4) provides a very general statistical model in-
deed.
6 The punctuated evolution of eco-
nomic systems
The model reexpresses external socioeconomic ecosystem dy-
namics, corporate cultural heritage, and corporate cognitive
behavior generating ‘behavioral phenotypes’, in terms of in-
teracting information sources. This instantiates Principle (5)
of the Introduction, producing a system of stochastic differen-
tial equations closely analogous to those used to describe more
traditional coevolutionary biological phenomena, and subject
to punctuated resilience shifts driven by internal large devia-
tions or by external perturbations.
We have used the formalism of an expanded Modern Syn-
thesis (Wallace, 2010) to characterize something of a general-
ized Darwinism appropriate to the study of economic pattern
and process, generating, in equation (4), what amount to dy-
namic regression models that can be fitted to real data. Like
simple static regression models, these empirical Onsager equa-
tions can be used to compare behaviors of a single system un-
der different, or different systems under the same, conditions.
Like simple regression models, these do not do the hard busi-
ness of scientific inference: the asymptotic limit theorems of
probability theory, from the Central Limit to the Rate Distor-
tion Theorem provide necessary, but not sufficient, structure.
Socioeconomic environments affect firms, and firms affect
embedding environments. Organizations can, locally, engage
in niche construction to protect themselves from environmen-
tal vagaries. Thus environments select phenotypes that, in a
sense, select environments. Corporate culture records the re-
sult, as does the embedding socioeconomic landscape, and the
system coevolves as a unit, with sudden, complicated transi-
tions between the quasi-equilibria of equation (4).
This is a slightly different picture than envisioned by
Aldrich et al. (2008), but one that is, perhaps, more con-
sonant with evolving evolutionary theory.
In contrast with Haldane and May (2011), and in agreement
with Johnson (2011), we do not see simple models as providing
a basis for policy decisions. Generalized Darwinism, and the
related statistical models developed here, provide necessary
conditions for many social system behaviors, but the hard
work of science lies in using these constraints to analyze data,
and proper data analysis alone, in an ideal world, supplies
the primary rational basis for policy decisions. Mathemati-
cal models of complex ecosystem phenomena, in the sense of
Pielou (1977, p.106), serve only to suggest directions for that
analysis.
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